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I.

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Youngblood stands by the legal analysis, and its application to the
instant dispute, that is set forth in his Opening Brief. He seeks to refrain from
unnecessarily repeating the arguments, regarding the correctness of which he
remains confident, that appear in that Brief.
II.

ARGUMENT
A.

AUTO-OWNERS' BRIEF DEALS WITH THINGS
THAT ARE REALLY NOT AT ISSUE. SUGGESTS
A MISUNDERSTANDING OF PARTS OF
MR. YOUNGBLOOD'S ARGUMENT. AND FAILS EVEN
TO ATTEMPT TO COUNTER SIGNIFICANT PARTS OF
HIS ARGUMENT. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE
THE DISTRICT COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
THE ESTOPPEL ISSUE.

As the Court will observe, Auto-Owners' Brief deals substantially with
things that are really not at issue. Mr. Youngblood has never, for example,
contested the proposition that he was a pedestrian. Nor has he argued, either
in the District Court proceedings or in this Appeal, that there is any ambiguity
in the subject policy of insurance or that that policy, by its terms, provides
coverage to him in the particulars of this situation. Nor has he argued waiver.
Mr. Youngblood points out that Auto-Owners appears to have
misunderstood part of his argument. He has not contended, and is not
presently contending (contrary to the suggestion in Auto-Owners' Brief at 13-

14), that Auto-Owners' waiving its subrogation interest should work to estop
Auto-Owners from denying coverage. He has brought the fact of AutoOwners' waiver of its subrogation interest to the Court's attention for
background purposes and to make it abundantly clear that Auto-Owners was
aware of the fact that the availability of u.i.m. coverage was important to him
and that he would be pursuing a claim under that coverage.
Another misconception under which Auto-Owners appears to labor (see
its Brief at 13) has to do with Mr. Youngblood's settlement of his underlying tort
claim. One of the things that Mr. Youngblood considered in connection with
the question of whether he should accept policy limits or pursue the tortfeasor
for assets beyond the $50,000 limits was the supposed availability of u.i.m.
insurance coverage. The fact that he obtained policy limits from the liability
carrier on the underlying claim does not somehow work to eviscerate or
undermine his claim that Auto-Owners is estopped to deny him u.i.m. benefits.
It underscores the validity of that claim.
Also, Auto-Owners has mistakenly, at pages 8-9 of its Brief,
characterized the subject representations of its agents as ones pertaining to
"future facts." Semantics aside, it is clear that both representations, the first
made by a sales representative and the second made by a claims adjuster,
referred to coverage that was supposedly available (but that was not, in fact,
2

available) under the subject policy. See Fact 13, set forth at 7-8 of
Mr. Youngblood's Opening Brief, and record references there cited.
Mr. Youngblood's primary contention is that Auto-Owners is estopped,
by reason of certain representations of its agents regarding the supposed
existence of u.i.m. coverage for him as a pedestrian, to deny him coverage. In
response to Mr. Youngblood's estoppel claim, Auto-Owners strongly relies, as
it did in the District Court proceedings, on this Court's case of Perkins v. Great
West Life Assurance Company. 814 P.2d 1125 (Utah App. 1991). AutoOwners fails to reckon with Mr. Youngblood's analysis, set forth at 10-19 of his
Opening Brief, that explains the difference between the situation in Perkins
and the situation in this case and that discusses well-reasoned, persuasive
case law from other jurisdictions. In those cases, as is the case here and as
was not the case in Perkins, affirmative misrepresentations were made by
insurance company representatives.
Auto-Owners attempts to distinguish but does not persuasively
distinguish the Utah Supreme Court's observations in Ellerbeck v. Continental
Casualty Co., 227 P. 805, 808 (Utah 1924). Mr. Youngblood has brought that
case to this Court's attention not because of its specific holding but because of
its observation, quoted in Mr. Youngblood's Opening Brief at 10, regarding the
importance, in Utah, of honesty and fair dealing in insurance relationships.
3

Auto-Owners does not even attempt to distinguish or explain away the
significance of Conder v. A.L. Williams & Associates. 739 P.2d 634 (Utah App.
1987), and Berkeley Bank for Co-ops v. Meibos. 607 P.2d 798 (Utah 1980),
cases cited by Mr. Youngblood in his Opening Brief at 17 and 18. These
cases all stand for the proposition that, as a matter of settled Utah
jurisprudence, people and companies who misrepresent things do so at their
peril.
According to Mr. Youngblood's deposition testimony (R. 65-66; 76; 95105), which has not been refuted by Auto-Owners, specific representations
were made regarding his being covered, as a pedestrian, that caused him to
acquire the policy and that played a substantial role in his settling the
underlying tort claim for liability policy limits. This Court very recently, in
Larsen v. Exclusive Cars. Inc.. 2004 UT App. 259, in the course of its reversal
of the trial court's summary rejection of a fraudulent misrepresentation claim,
restated the hornbook rule that what is contained within the four comers of a
contract is not necessarily outcome-determinative. Questions of reasonable
reliance on extra-contractual representations are, despite Auto-Owners'
minimalistic argument to the contrary, worthy of serious judicial consideration
in cases of claimed estoppel just as they are in claims of fraudulent
misrepresentation. If Auto-Owners is correct in its analysis and if the rule of
4

Perkins is to be applied as broadly as Auto-Owners has argued it should be,
people even less sophisticated than Mr. Youngblood, and even the mentally
infirm, will be held to have no estoppel remedy, even in cases of the most
egregious misrepresentations, if they, in reliance on pro-coverage
misrepresentations by sloppy or unscrupulous insurance company
representatives, do not read the language of their policies. Mr. Youngblood
submits that that should not and cannot be the law.
The Utah Supreme Court has recently defined what is meant by "public
policy." In Hansen v. America Online, Inc.. 2004 UT 62, fl 12, that court
explained:
'Public policy' is the label we attach to those shared expectations and
standards of conduct which have acquired both widespread and deeply
held allegiance among the citizenry generally.
There is no direct Supreme Court guidance on the question of whether
this Court should accept the view of cases such as American Family Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Jefferv. 200 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12225 (S.D. Ind. 2000), and Harr v.
Allstate Ins. Co.. 255 A.2d 208 (N.J. 1969), discussed in Mr. Youngblood's
Opening Brief at 13-16, that insurance companies should be estopped to deny
coverage when their representatives make oral representations on which their
insureds rely. But the analyses of those cases make sense, and this Court
should follow the lead of those courts and the observations of the Utah
5

Supreme Court in Ellerbeck and Berkeley Bank and this Court in Conder and
Larsen regarding the importance of honesty and fair dealing and in furtherance
of the important public policy of holding persons and companies to their
promises.
This Court should reverse the District Court's granting of Auto-Owners'
Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Mr. Youngblood's estoppel
contention.
B.

TRIABLE QUESTIONS OF FACT EXIST WITH RESPECT
TO THE QUESTION OF WHETHER AUTO-OWNERS
BREACHED ITS DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR
DEALING. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE
DISTRICT COURT'S SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF
MR. YOUNGBLOOD'S BAD-FAITH CLAIM.

As pointed out by Mr. Youngblood in his Opening Brief at 19, the Utah
Supreme Court, in Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 701 P.2d 795, 801
(Utah 1985), made it clear that an insurance company can be found liable to
its insured, for breach of the company's duty of good faith and fair dealing, if its
investigation of, evaluation of, and decision regarding a claim is not done
"diligently," "fairly," and "promptly." In Utah, the question of whether an
insurance company has discharged its duty of good faith and fair dealing is not
necessarily dependent on the question of whether an insured is ultimately
determined to be entitled to benefits under a policy. Beck makes it clear that it
is the process and not just the result of an insurance company's handling of a
6

claim that is at the heart of the question of whether the insurance company
has acted in good faith and diligently, fairly, and promptly. Mr. Youngblood
submits that the Court should analyze this question separately from its
analysis of the estoppel claim and should determine that the particulars of
Auto-Owners' handling of Mr. Youngblood's claim (see Statement of Facts
appearing at pages 5-8 of Mr. Youngblood's Opening Brief) presents triable
questions of fact regarding Mr. Youngblood's bad-faith claim. A jury could
reasonably find that Auto-Owners did not diligently investigate
Mr. Youngblood's claim, did not fairly evaluate it, and/or did not reasonably
promptly reach its ultimate determination. A jury could reasonably find that
Auto-Owners did not treat Mr. Youngblood fairly in its overall processing of the
claim.
Mr. Youngblood through his counsel acknowledges that research has
unearthed no case with facts similar to those of this case in which a court has
held that a triable question of fact has been presented on the claim of breach
of good faith and fair dealing. But Mr. Youngblood also points out that no
contrary authority has been found. The reach of Beck v. Farmers is broad,
and this Court should rule that the question of whether Auto-Owners breached
its duty of good faith and fair dealing, in one or more particulars, is (analogous
to, for example, the question of whether a defendant in a personal injury case
7

operated his motor vehicle in a negligent manner) a quintessential jury
question. The Court should reverse the District Court's grant of summary
judgment on Mr. Youngblood's bad-faith claim.
If the Court rejects this part of Mr. Youngblood's analysis and holds, for
whatever reason, that, as a matter of law, Auto-Owners did not breach its duty
of good faith and fair dealing, the Court should nonetheless determine that
triable questions of fact exist with respect to Mr. Youngblood's contention that
Auto-Owners is estopped to deny coverage.
III.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis and that set forth in his Opening Brief,
Mr. Youngblood urges the Court to reverse the Summary Judgment in favor of
Auto-Owners and to remand this case for jury trial.
Respectfully submitted this

J

day of August, 2004.

PETER" C. COLLINS
PETER C. COLLINS, L.L.C.
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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